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ARTICLES

PIERRE V. F. Bos*
MARCO M. SLOTBOOM**

The EC Technology Transfer Regulation-

A Practitioner's Perspective
I. Introduction
On January 31, 1996, the European Commission (the "Commission") adopted
a regulation on the application of article 85(3) of the EC Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer agreements (the "Regulation").' The Regulation combines in a single instrument on the one hand regulation 2349/84, exempting certain
patent licensing agreements (the "Patent Regulation"), and on the other hand

Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The InternationalLawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
authors.
*Trenitd van Doorne, Brussels, Belgium.
**Trenitd van Doorne, Brussels, Belgium.
1. See Regulation 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of art. 85(3) of the Treaty to
certain categories of technology transfer agreements, 1996 O.J. (L31)2. See also Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW REVIEW, 157 (1996); Saltzman, The New Technology TransferBlock Exemption,
INTERNATIONAL LAW & REGULATION 2, 27 (1996); Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3):
The Technology Transfer Regulation-ProceduralIssues, 6 EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW REVIEW,
331 (1996); Reindl, Intellectual PropertyandIntra-Community Trade, in CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE,
453 (Berry Hawk ed. 1997); Korah, The Technology TransferRegulation, 4 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REVIEW, 1 (1996); Korah, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996).
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regulation 556/89, exempting certain know-how licensing agreements (the
"Know-How Regulation"). 2 By combining these two legal instruments, the Commission intends to simplify the way in which technology transfers are treated
under the EC competition rules. Such a simplification should contribute to the
objectives of the Regulation, i.e., the encouragement of the dissemination of
technological knowledge in the European Community (the Community) and the
promotion of the manufacture of technically more sophisticated products.'
The Regulation entered into force on April 1, 1996. It affects the transfer of
technology in the industry as a whole. It may, however, be of particular importance in sectors where intellectual property, best protected by patents or undisclosed by know-how, is fundamental, such as electronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
This article first describes briefly the legal background and the drafting history
of the Regulation. Subsequently, it will discuss the Regulation's most relevant
provisions. After having reviewed three proposed changes of policy towards
technology transfer agreements which, in the end, the Commission has not
adopted, the article will discuss to what extent the scope of the Regulation has
become broader.
II. The EC Technology Transfer Regulation
A.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE REGULATION: THE

EC

COMPETITION RULES

Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty prohibits agreements between economic operators that restrict competition within the Community. The consequences of an
infringement of article 85(1) may be serious. Pursuant to article 85(2), those
elements of an agreement that infringe article 85(1) are invalid.4 Furthermore,
the Commission may impose fines.5 In addition, companies infringing article
85(1) may be condemned to pay damages before the civil courts of the Member
States.
After due notification by one of the parties pursuant to article 85(3), the Commission may exempt an agreement from the prohibition of article 85(1) if-in
2. See Commission Regulation 2349/84, 1984 O.J. (L 219) 15, and Commission Regulation
556/89, 1989 O.J. (L 61) 1, both amended by Commission Regulation 151/93, 1993 O.J. (L 21)
8.
3. See Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital 3, supra note 1. The notion of "products" in
the Regulation includes goods and services. See supra note I, Commission Regulation 240/96, art.
10(8), the definition of "licensed products."
4. Whether these elements can be excised and the rest of the agreement is enforceable is a
question of the law which governs the agreement in question. See, e.g., Case 56/65, La Technique
Mini~re v. Maschinenbau ULM, 1966 E.C.R. 235.
5. Fines may vary from ECU 1,000 (appr. US$ 1,300) to ECU 1,000,000 (appr. US$ 1,300,000)
or up to 10 percent of the most recent total turnover of the undertakings concerned. The highest
fine imposed on a single undertaking amounts to ECU 75 million (ca. US$ 100 million) (see Commission Decision Tetra Pak 11, confirmed in case C-338/94P, Tetra Pak v. Comm'n, 1996 E.C.R.
(forthcoming)).
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short-the advantages of the agreement outweigh its disadvantages. 6 The Commission tends to apply article 85(1) broadly and to examine subsequently whether
an exemption is available. As a consequence, notably vertical agreements more
strictly are treated under EC competition law than in most other competition
laws.7
However, the Commission lacks the resources to deal with notifications seeking
individual exemptions from the prohibition of article 85(1): it grants only a few
individual exemptions per year. The Commission sends many more administrative
letters informing the parties that there is no reason for it to take further action
and that it is closing the file. Although these letters are not binding on national
courts, the European Court of Justice has held that national courts should take
into account any view expressed by the Commission in such letters.8
In order to overcome the problem of a lack of the Commission's resources,
the Council of the European Union has empowered the Commission to adopt
regulations exempting certain groups of agreements (so-called group exemptions). 9 The Commission has used its powers to adopt group exemptions not
only in respect of technology transfer agreements, but also, e.g., of exclusive
distribution agreements, exclusive purchasing agreements, specialization0
agreements, research and development agreements, and franchise agreements. '
In the past, technology transfer agreements have given rise to a number of
cases under article 85. A landmark case of the European Court of Justice on
exclusive licensing agreements is Maize Seed of 1982." The Court held that a
license whereby the licensor merely undertakes not to grant other licenses in
respect of the same territory and not to compete himself with the licensee of that
6. Pursuant to Commission Regulation 290/96, art. 85(3), supra note 1, agreements may be
exempted if they:
-contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress,
-allow customers a fair share of the resulting benefit,
-do not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable
to the attainment of the above-mentioned objectives, and,
-do not afford these undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition of a
substantial part of the Community in respect of the products in question.
7. See for a recent critical article about the Commission's approach to vertical agreements
Barry Hawk, System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law, 32 COMMON MARKET
LAW REVIEW 973 (1995). The Commission decided recently to undertake a fundamental review of
its policy towards vertical restraints. This review has taken the form of a Green Paper, which has
been published at the end of January 1997. In the Green Paper, the Commission considers a more
flexible position towards vertical agreements. See also David Deacon, Vertical Restraints UnderEU
Competition Law: New Directions, in 1995 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, 307 (Barry Hawk
ed 1996).
8. See, e.g., ECJ, Guerlain (253/78, 1-3/79), [1980] ECR 2327.
9. See, e.g., Council Regulation 19/65 delegating powers to exempt categories of exclusive
dealing and licensing agreements, 1995 O.J. (533).
10. See, respectively, Commission Regulations 1983/83 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1; 1989/83 1983 O.J.
(L 173) 5; 417/85 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1; 418/85 1985 O.J. (L 53) 5; 4087/88 1988 O.J. (L 61) 1.
11. See Case 258/78 L.C. Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v. Comm'n, 1982 E.C.R. 2015.
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territory (so-called open exclusive licenses) may not in itself be incompatible with
article 85(1) where the license is concerned with the introduction and protection
of a new technology in the licensed territory. 2 Otherwise, technology transfer
agreements providing for exclusive manufacturing and sale will normally fall
under article 85(1) (so-called closed exclusive licenses).' 3 The Commission has
interpreted this case law rather narrowly; in its view most exclusive licenses are
anticompetitive. 14
Other provisions in technology transfer agreements, such as tying obligations, 5
post-termination restraints, 16 no-challenge clauses,' 7 and pricing obligations on
the licensee,' 8 may also fall within the scope of article 85(1). '9These provisions
were dealt with by the Patent and Know-How Regulations in the past, and are
now dealt with by the Regulation.
Article 86 of the EC Treaty prohibits any unilateral abuse by one or more
economic operators of a dominant position within the Community. There is no
possibility to claim an exemption from this provision similar to article 85(3).
The Commission may impose fines on parties that infringe article 86.20
Article 86 may apply to the acquisition by a dominant position of an exclusive
patent license. For instance, in its Tetra Pak 1 decision, the Commission held that
exclusivity of a patent license obtained by a dominant undertaking was abusive,
notwithstanding the fact that the license complied with the Patent Regulation. In
the view of the Commission, exclusivity not only strengthened the market position
of the dominant company, but also prevented or delayed the entry into the market
of a competing technology. In its judgment on this decision, the Court of First
Instance confirmed that article 86 may apply to license agreements even if they
are covered by a group exemption.22

12. See supra note 11, at § 58.
13. See, e.g., Commission Decisions Velcro/Aplix, 985 O.J. (L 233) 22; Boussois/interpane,
1987 O.J. (L 50) 30; Delta Chemie, 1988 O.J. (L 309) 34.
14. Art. I of Regulation 240/96 exempts all exclusive licenses from the prohibition of Article
85(1), including "open exclusive licenses," which in the European Court's view fall outside the
scope of Article 85(1). This provision, thus, implies that all such licenses infringe Article 85(1),
despite the fact that Recital (10), reiterating the Maize Seed judgment of the European Court of
Justice, states otherwise.
15. See, e.g., Commission Decisions Vaessen/Morris, 1979 O.J. (L 19) 32; Velcro/Aplix, supra
note 12. See Zanon, Ties in Patent Licensing Agreements, 5 EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW 391 (1980).
16. See, e.g., Case 320/87, Ottung v. Klee, E.C.R. 1177 (1989).
17. See, e.g., Case 65/86, Bayer v. Sullhofer, E.C.R. 5249 (1988).
18. See, e.g., Case 27/88, Erauw-Jacquery, E.C.R. 1919 (1988).
19. See, for a discussion of competition law aspects of provisions in know-how and patent
agreements, Guttuso, Know-How Agreements, in 1987 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE (Barry
Hawk ed. 1988); Venit, In the Wake of Windsurfing: Patent Licensing in the Common Market.
20. See supra note 5.
21. See Commission Decision 88/501, Tetra Pak I (BTG license), 1988 O.J. (L 272) 27.
22. See Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing v. Comm'n, 1990 E.C.R. 11-309.
VOL. 32, NO. I
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THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE REGULATION

The Patent Regulation, dating from 1984, exempted certain patent licensing
agreements, while the Know-How Regulation, adopted in 1989, applied to knowhow licensing agreements. 23 Mixed patent and know-how agreements could be
exempted by the Know-How Regulation if they were not covered by the Patent
Regulation. The Patent Regulation was due to expire at the end of 1994. On this
occasion the Commission proposed to replace with one single instrument both
the Patent Regulation and the Know-How Regulation, which would only expire
on December 31, 1999.
On June 30, 1994, the Commission published a preliminary draft of this single
instrument, i.e., a group exemption for technology transfer agreements covering
patent, know-how, and mixed licensing agreements.24 At a hearing on January
31, 1995, interested parties were invited by the Commission to submit their
comments on the draft. The draft was severely criticized by industry as well as
in legal literature.25 A major point of controversy was the Commission's proposal
to introduce market share thresholds for the application of the Regulation. This
criticism gave the Commission cause to review its draft. A revised draft, including
an adapted market share test, was circulated for informal consultation in September 1995.
Subsequently, a fierce battle arose within the Commission between the Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV), which was in favor of market share
thresholds in the Regulation, and the Directorate-General for Industry (DG III),
which fought against the inclusion of these thresholds.26 In December 1995,
another revised draft was circulated informally. Apparently, DG III had won
the battle, since this draft no longer contained market share thresholds for the
application of the Regulation. On January 31, 1996, the draft was officially
adopted.27
C. THE REGULATION

1. Combining Two Group Exemptions in a Single Instrument
In the past, industry complained about the different treatment of patent, knowhow, and mixed agreements under the Patent and Know-How Regulations. This
23. See supra note 2.
24. 1995 O.J. (C 178) 3.
25. See, e.g., Korah, The PreliminaryDraft of a New EC Group Exemption for Technology
Licensing, EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW REVIEW, 167-170; Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer
Block Exemption, 7 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW 259-262 (1994); Korah, The PreliminaryDraft of a New EC Group Exemption for Technology Licensing, 7 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY REVIEW 263-268 (1994); De Souza, The Commission'sDraft Group Exemption on Technology Transfer, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW REVIEW, 338-341 (1994).
26. See Reuters press release "Commission at odds over draft new patent licensing rules, " Sept.

28, 1995.
27. See supra note 1.
SPRING 1998
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different treatment was considered to be unnecessarily complicated and unfair.
For instance, the Know-How Regulation used to be more liberal than the Patent
Regulation since it had a longer white list of permitted clauses in licensing
agreements and a shorter black list of forbidden clauses. There was no justification
for this more advantageous treatment of technology transfer agreements falling
within the scope of the Know-How Regulation.28
The advantageous treatment of licensing agreements in the Know-How Regulation was also peculiar in view of the fact that at the time the Commission adopted
the Patent Regulation it still had a rather negative view on know-how licenses.
Indeed, in the preamble of one of the drafts for the Patent Regulation in 1983
the Commission stated:
Yet know-how does not have the same legal standing as a patent. Patent protection is
justified because of the patent's limited life and the fact that the state of the art is
advanced for the public benefit by disclosures made in the patent application. This is
not the case with know-how that is kept secret. 29
Only later the Commission seems to have recognized the importance of know-how
licensing. 3°
Under the Regulation, technology transfer agreements are in general treated
equally. In particular in respect of mixed agreements, the Regulation simplifies
the system which existed previously. Both the Patent Regulation and Know-How
Regulation applied to mixed agreements, but these agreements only fell within
the scope of the Know-How Regulation if they were not exempted by the Patent
Regulation. 3' Since the Know-How Regulation was more liberal than the Patent
Regulation, it was often more advantageous to bring a mixed agreement under
the Know-How Regulation than under the Patent Regulation. In practice, mixed
agreements were often negotiated to satisfy the more advantageous Know-How
Regulation. Under the Regulation, industry will no longer have to weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of bringing a mixed agreement under one group
exemption or the other. This can be seen as an improvement.32
The structure of the Regulation is very similar to that of its predecessors. It
first exempts restrictions that mostly relate to territorial protection granted to the
licensee (4.2).3 It then mentions white-listed clauses in licensing agreements that
normally do not restrict competition but are exempted in case they do (4.3).34 The
28. See KORAH, KNow-How LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES REGU-

LATION 556/89 51-52 (1984).
29. Recital (7) of an unpublished draft of 1983.
30. See Norman Rosen, New EEC Regulation Licensing, in FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, 10-1, 10-4.
31. See Commission Regulation 556/89, art. 1(7), 1990 O.J. (C 38).
32. See Van den Bergh, Modern Industrial Organizationversus Old-fashionedEuropean Competition Law, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW REVIEW, 75 (1996). "Distorted business decisions may
follow if the form of the transaction is chosen because of the more lenient treatment of a less efficient
alternative." Id. at 80.
33. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 1.
34. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2.
VOL. 32, NO. I
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black list of the Regulation contains clauses that are forbidden (4.4).3 Restrictive
clauses that are neither white-listed nor black-listed are unofficially called greyclauses. Agreements containing such clauses may be exempted through the "opposition procedure" (4.5).36 The Regulation contains some provisions on its
duration and the continued applicability of its predecessors (4.6)." 7
2. Restrictions Exempted by the Regulation
a. An Overview
The Regulation exempts a number of restrictions in technology transfer
agreements, but the duration of the exemption depends on whether it concerns
a pure patent licensing agreement,38 a pure know-how licensing agreement,39 or
a mixed licensing agreement.'
b. Restrictions on the Licensor
The licensor may agree not to license anyone else in the licensee's territory
and not to exploite4' the technology there himself:
" in case of a pure patent licensing agreement, to the extent that and for
as long as
the licensed product is protected by parallel patents of the
42
licensee;
" in case of a pure know-how licensing agreement, for a period of 10 years
commencing with the43first putting on the market within the Community by
one of the licensees;

35. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 3.
36. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 4.
37. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 13.
38. Patents may be the Member States' own patents, Community patents, and European patents
under the European Patent Convention. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital
(4). For the purpose of the Regulation, the notion of a "patent" includes patent applications, utility
models, application for registration of utility models, and plant breeder's certificates. See supra note
1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 8.
39. "Know-how" is "a body of technical information that is secret, substantial and identified
in an appropriate form." See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 10(1). Know-how
is secret if it is not generally known or accessible so that part of its value consists in the lead which
the licensee is expected to gain at the date ofconclusion of the agreement. Id. art. 10(1)-(4). Know-how
is substantial if it is of importance for (the development of) the whole or a significant part of a
manufacturing process, a product, or service. Id. Know-how is identified if it is possible to verify
that it satisfies the criteria of secrecy and substantiality, and to ensure that the licensee is not unduly
restricted in his exploitation of his own technology. Id.
40. A mixed licensing agreement is a combined patent and know-how licensing agreement. See
supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital (4).
41. This includes any sales (actively or passively). See supra note 1, Commission Regulation
240/96, art. 10(10).
42. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, arts. l(1)(1), 1(l)(2), 1(2). "Parallel
patents" are patents "which, in spite of the divergence which remains in the absence of any unification
of national rules concerning industrial property, protect the same invention in various Member States."
Supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 10(13).
43. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, arts. l(l)(1), 1(1)(2), 1(3).
SPRING 1998
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* in case of a mixed licensing agreement, for 10 years commencing with the
first putting on the market in the Community by a licensee or, if longer,
the period available to pure patent licenses, but only in Member States in
which the licensed technology is protected by necessary patents."
"Necessary patents" are "patents [the licensing of which] is necessary for the putting
into effect of the licensed technology in so far as, [in their] absence[,] the realization
of the licensed technology would not be possible or45would [only] be possible to a lesser
extent or in more difficult or costly conditions."
c. Restrictions on the Licensee
The licensee may agree:
" (i) not to manufacture or use the licensed products or use the licensed process46
in the territories of other licensees within the Community; (ii) not to exploit
the licensed technology in the territory of the licensor within the Community;
and (iii) not to market actively the products in the territories of other licensees
in the Community:
* in case of a pure patent licensing agreement, to the extent that47and for
as long as the licensed product is protected by parallel patents;
* in case of a pure know-how licensing agreement, for a period of 10 years
commencing with the first
putting on the market within the Community
48
by one of the licensees;
* in case of a mixed licensing agreement, for 10 years commencing with
the first putting on the market in the Community by a licensee or, if
longer, the period available to pure patent licenses, but only in Member
States in which the licensed technology is protected by necessary patents.49
* not to market even passively the products in the territories of other licensees
during a period of 5 years from the moment any licensee has first put the
licensed product on the market in the Community, irrespective of whether
inserted in a pure patent licensing agreement, a pure know-how licensing
agreement, or a mixed licensing agreement;50
" (i) to use only the licensor's trademark or get-up, provided the licensee
may identify himself as the manufacturer; and (ii) to limit production and
sales of the products to what the licensee requires as input for his own
products (provided that the licensee may freely determine the relevant quantity of these products):

44. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, arts.
45. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation, 240/96, art.
46. See supra note 32.
47. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, arts.
supra note 42 for the definition of parallel patents.
48. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, arts.
49. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, arts.
supra note 45 for the definition of necessary patents.
50. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, arts.
VOL. 32, NO. I
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* in case of a pure patent licensing agreement, to the extent that51and for
as long as the licensed product is protected by parallel patents;
* in case of a pure know-how licensing agreement, during the lifetime
of the license for as long as the know-how remains secret and substantial;52
* in case of a mixed licensing agreement, for the longer period available
to pure patent or know-how licenses.53
With respect to all the above-mentioned restrictions the Commission Regulation permits restrictions of the same kind but of a more limited scope. 4
d. A Certain Difference Remains Between Patent Licenses and
Know-How Licenses
In respect of the duration of territorial protection exempted by the Regulation,
a difference between patent and know-how licensing agreements will thus remain.
In case of pure patent agreements territorial protection (except against passive
sales) may be granted to the extent that and for as long as parallel patents exist
in the territories of respectively the licensor, the licensee, and other licensees.55
However, for pure know-how licensing agreements this period is fixed to ten
years from the date when the licensed product is first put on the market in the
Community by a licensee. 56
The Commission takes the view that it is appropriate to limit protection in
case of know-how agreements since the point at which the know-how ceases to
be secret can be difficult to determine.57 Longer periods of territorial protection
for know-how agreements may be allowed by individual exemptions pursuant
to article 85(3) if the protection is necessary to protect expensive and risky investment or where the parties are not competitors at the date of the grant of the
license. 51
The different treatment of patent and know-how licensing agreements under
the Regulation is in particular relevant for mixed licensing agreements. Through
a mixed agreement, a licensee may be protected from active sales in its territory
for either ten years from the date that the licensed product is put on the market
by one of the licensees in the Community or, if longer, for the duration of licensed
necessary patents in that territory. As said, a patent is necessary if in its absence

51. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, arts. l(l)(7), 1(2). See supra note 42 for
the definition of parallel patents.
52. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, arts. l(l)(7), 1(3).
53. The Commission Regulation does not give an explicit rule on the duration of exemption of
this provision in mixed agreements. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, arts. 1(1)(7),
1(4).
54. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 1(5).
55. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 1(2).
56. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 1(3).
57. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital 13.
58. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, Recitals 12-14.
SPRING 1998
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the realization of the licensed technology would not be possible or would only
be possible to a lesser extent or in more difficult or costly conditions. 59 This
notion of "necessary patents" is vague. Parties may believe that licensed patents
fulfill the requirements of necessity, but courts (and, in the end, the Court of
Justice) may have another view. 6° Using "necessary patents" as a notion to
calculate the duration of territorial protection permissible in mixed agreements
thus considerably reduces the level of legal certainty regarding territorial restrictions in mixed agreements.
e. "Harmonisation" of the Trigger Date of Territorial Protection
The period of territorial protection granted by the Regulation will be measured
from the date when the licensed product is first put on the market in the Community
by one of the licensees.6 The Regulation differs in this respect from both the
Patent Regulation and the Know-How Commission Regulation.
In the Patent Regulation, as well as in the first draft of the Regulation,62 the
relevant date started from the moment that the product was first put on the market
by one of the licensees or the licensor. It was argued that most technology transfer
agreements would not fall under the Regulation, since they are usually concluded
after the licensor starts marketing the licensed products and potential licensees
are attracted by the commercial success of innovations.63 Moreover, the trigger
date of the Patent Regulation would fail to protect small and medium-sized licensors that could not produce the licensed products themselves on a small scale
without the time limits starting to run. The Commission has apparently listened
to this criticism, since the Regulation no longer refers to the putting on the market
by the licensor.
Under the Know-How Regulation, the duration of territorial protection given
to a license was measured from the moment of the first license in the territory
of the licensee. This provision has been criticized as well. If the first licensee
in a certain territory did not adequately exploit its license and this license was
subsequently terminated, a later licensee may have needed to be protected for
the full period, but the permissible period would already have started to run from
the moment of the first license. 6
The trigger date chosen by the Regulation (the moment of the first putting on
the market of a licensed product by any licensee in the Community) may begin
59. See supra note 1.
60. The licensor or licensee may challenge the qualification in a mixed agreement of "necessary"
patents to remove territorial protection of the other. The licensor may stipulate that if the licensee
does so, he will terminate the agreement. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art.
2(l)(16).
61. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 1(2)-(4).
62. See supra note 2.
63. See Art and Van Liedekerke, Developments in EC Competition Low in 1994, an Overview,
32 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 935 (1995).
64. See KoRAH, supra note 28, at 169.
VOL. 32, NO. 1
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even earlier than that of the first licensee in a given territory under the KnowHow Regulation in so far as a licensee for another territory has already put the
contract product on the market whether or not he was successful.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Regulation provides for a single rule for establishing the trigger date of territorial protection in the pure patent agreements, pure
know-how agreements, and mixed agreements can be considered as a welcome
"harmonization."
3. A Longer White List
The white list of the Regulation sets forth obligations that do not normally
restrict competition, but are exempted just in case they do.65 Additionally, clauses
with a more limited scope than white-listed clauses are exempted. 66 The white
list is not limitative, in so far as other obligations may also fall outside the scope
of article 85(1).67 Such obligations are, however, not exempted by the white list
in case they are restrictive of competition. Agreements containing such restrictive
obligations may be notified under the opposition procedure. 68 The white list is
equally applicable to pure patent agreements, pure know-how agreements and
mixed agreements. It permits the following restrictions:
" an obligation on the licensee not to divulge know-how
disclosed by the
69
licensor (even after the agreement has expired);
* an obligation on the licensee to cease using the licensed technology after
the termination of the agreement in so far as and as long as the know-how
70
is still secret or the patents are still in force (a "post-term use" ban);
" an obligation on the licensee to make severable improvements available to
the licensee on a nonexclusive basis (a nonexclusive "grant-back" clause).
The licensor may be obliged to grant an exclusive license of his own improve7
ments to the licensee; 1
* an obligation on the licensee to restrict his exploitation of the licensed technology to one or more technical fields of application
"or to one or more
72
product markets" (a "field of use" clause);
" the right of the licensor to exercise the rights conferred by a patent to oppose
73
the exploitation of the technology by the licensee outside [its] territory;

65. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(1), (2).
66. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(3).
67. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital (18).
68. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital (25). For a discussion of the
opposition procedure see infra section C.5.
69. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(1).
70. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(3).
71. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(1)(4).
72. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(8).
73. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(14). For a discussion about the
relation between this provision and the free movement of goods under Articles 30 and 36, see Reindl,
supra note 1, § 3.1.
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* the right of the licensor to "terminate the agreement if the licensee contests
the [secrecy] of the . know-how74or challenges the validity of the licensed
patent within the [Community];"" a right of the licensor to terminate a patent licensing agreement "if the
' 75
licensee raises the claim that [the] patent is not necessary;
" "an obligation on the licensee to use his best endeavor to [exploit] the
76
licensed technology;"

"

"a right of the licensor to terminate the exclusivity granted to the licensee
and to stop [communicating] improvements to him when the licensee enters
into competition with the licensor and to require the licensee to prove that
the licensed know-how77 is not being used for the production of [goods] other
than those licensed."-

The white list of the Regulation is longer than, in particular, the white list of
the Patent Regulation. 78 It copies, also in respect of patent licenses, the following
provisions which-in the past-were only available under the Know-How Regulation:
" the obligation on the licensee to continue paying royalties after the know-how
becomes publicly known or after the patents
prematurely lose their validity
79
other than by the action of the licensor;
" the obligation on the licensee to restrict exploitation of the licensed technology to one or more product markets (and not only to specific technical fields
like under the Patent Commission Regulation); 80
* the obligation on the licensee not to use technology to construct facilities
for third parties; 8 and
" the obligation on the licensee to limit production of the licensed product to
the quantity required for the manufacture of the licensee's products.82
A number of (other) "new" white clauses were already mentioned in a hidden
way in the Patent and Know-How Commission Regulations. For instance, the
"best endeavors" clause 83 was already mentioned as an exception to a black
74. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(1)(15).
75. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(1)(16). See supra note 60, relating
to the duration of territorial restraints in mixed agreements.
76. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(1)(17).
77. See supra note I, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(18).
78. See supra note 2, Commission Regulation 2349/84, art. 2.
79. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(7).
80, See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(8). The differences between the
notions "technical fields" and "product markets" are, however, vague. On one occasion the European Commission has pleaded that restrictions on the field of use are acceptable only if they relate
to different product markets. See ECJ, Windsurfing Int'l. Inc. v. EC Commission (Case 193/83),
[1986] ECR 611, at § 42 [1986] 3 CMLR 489, [1988] FSR 139. Under the Know-How Regulation
and the Commission Regulation, this interpretation does not make sense, since both the allocation
of "technical fields of use" and "product markets" are white-listed.
81. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(12).
82. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(13).
83. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(17).
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clause in the Patent and Know-How Regulations.4 As such, these clauses might
arguably not have been white but grey,8 5and might, thus, have prompted notification under the opposition procedure. Now, under the Commission Regulation
these clauses are white-listed.
4. A Shorter Black List
The black list contains provisions that will prevent the application of the Commission Regulation to technology licensing agreements. Such restrictions cannot
be exempted through the opposition procedure and can be declared exempted only
by an individual exemption pursuant to article 85(3).86 However, the Commission
tends to treat black-listed clauses as per se violations without any economic
analysis. Thus, even when the Commission acts on an individual exemption basis,
a black-listed provision is likely to be rejected. The black list of the Regulation,
which is limitative, prohibits the following provisions:
* restrictions regarding the determination
of prices, components of prices, or
87
discounts for the licensed product;
* an obligation where one party is restricted from competing within the Community with the other party in respect of research and development, production, use, or distribution of competing products (a "non-competition"
clause) ;88
" obligations on the licensor or the licensee
making parallel imports in the
89
Member States impossible or difficult;
* restrictions agreed upon by parties, which were competitors for the contract
product before the license was granted, to allocate customers within the
same technological field of use or the same product market (a "customer
allocation" clause); 9°
* restrictions regarding the quantities to be manufactured or sold (unless specifically permitted by other provisions of the Regulation); 9'
* an obligation on the licensee to assign in whole or in part to the licensor rights
to improvements to or new applications of the licensed technology; 92 and
* an obligation on the licensor which results in territorial protection of
the
93
licensee during a longer period than permitted under the Regulation.
The black list of the Regulation is considerably shorter than those of its predecessors. The following obligations on the licensee are no longer black-listed:
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See Commission Regulation 2349/84, art. 3(3), and Commission Regulation 559/89, art. 3(9).
See KORAH, supra note 28, at 163.
See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital (19).
See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 3(1).
See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 3(2).
See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 3(3).
See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 3(4).
See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96. art. 3(5).
See supra note I, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 3(6).
See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 3(7).
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* an obligation not to contest the secrecy of the licensed know-how or to
challenge the validity
of licensed patents within the Community (a "no94
challenge" clause);
* a tying clause which is not necessary for a technically proper exploitation
of the licensed technology or to ensure that the product meets accepted
minimum specifications; 9'
* an obligation not to continue to use the licensed know-how after the termination of the agreement where the know-how has
meanwhile become publicly
96
known other than by action of the licensee;
* an obligation to pay royalties on goods or services which are not entirely
or partially produced by means of the licensed technology or for the use
of know-how which has become publicly known by the action of the
licensor;97
* an obligation to accept automatic prolongation of the initial duration of
the licensing agreement by the inclusion in it of any new improvements
communicated by the licensor; 9'
* an obligation to grant the licensor the exclusive right for improvements to or
new application of the licensed technology which would prevent the licensee
during the currency of the licensing agreement and/or thereafter from using
his own improvements in so far as these are severable from the licensor's
own know-how or from licensing them to third parties, where such licensing
would not disclose the licensor's know-how that is still secret (an "exclusive
grant-back clause); 99 and
* customer allocation restrictions where the parties were not competitors before the license was granted.'o
By shortening the black list for technology transfer agreements, the Commission has taken a more liberal position towards these agreements. Although this
change of policy should be welcomed, shortening the black list does not remove
94. See supra note 2, Commission Regulation 556/89, art. 3(5), and Commission Regulation
2349/84, art. 3(4). This clause has become grey in the Regulation. See supra note 1, Commission
Regulation 240/96, art. 4(2)(b). A "softened" version of the no-challenge clause is white-listed;
see supra note 1,Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(1)(15).
95. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 556/89, art. 3(3), and supra note 2, Commission
Regulation 2349/84, art. 3(9). This clause has become grey in the Regulation. See supra note 1,
Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 4(2)(a). A "softened" version of the tying clause is white-listed.
See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(1)(5).
96. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 556/89, art. 3(1).
97. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 556/89, art. 3(5), and supra note 1, Commission
Regulation 2349/84, art. 3(4).
98. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 4(2)(a), and supra note 1, Commission
Regulation 556/89, art. 3(10).
99. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 556/89, art. 3(2). Note that a nonexclusive grantback clause is white-listed; see supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(4). An obligation to assign any improvements to the licensor is black-listed; see supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 3(6).
100. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 3(4).
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legal uncertainty. Clauses that used to be black are now mostly grey, since they are
not exempted or white-listed. Thus, the Regulation does not apply to technology
transfer agreements including these clauses, unless the parties have made use of
the opposition procedure.
5. Opposition Procedure
Licensing agreements containing restrictions of competition that are not expressly permitted by the Regulation, but do not come within the black list of the
Regulation either, are still exempted when they are notified to the Commission and
the latter does not oppose such exemption within four months.' 0 ' The Regulation
mentions certain tying clauses and no-challenge clauses as examples of such grey
clauses. 102
The opposition procedure has been copied almost literally from the Patent and
Know-How Regulations.' °3 The main difference is the shorter time limit within
which the Commission may oppose a clause in the agreement, i.e., four months.
This period is considerably shorter than the six-month period under the Patent
and Know-How Regulations. For industry, this shorter time limit can be seen
as an improvement since companies will sooner have legal certainty on the validity
of their licensing agreement."'
6. Duration, Grandfather Clause
The Regulation will apply from April 1, 1996, until March 31, 2006.1°5 It
"grandfathers" licensing agreements that existed prior to the entry into force
of the Regulation and which benefitted from exemption under the Patent and
Know-How Regulations: these Regulations (and not the Regulation) will continue
to apply to those agreements until March 31, 2006.106 Since the Regulation has
a longer white list and a shorter black list, existing agreements exempted by the
Patent and Know-How Regulations are also generally exempted by the Regulation. Only existing agreements exempted pursuant to the opposition procedures
of those regulations, therefore, seem to benefit from the "grandfather clause."
Agreements that contain provisions which are not exempted by the Regulation
but are notified before the entry into force of the Regulation may benefit from

101. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 4. If the Commission opposes exemption, and the notification is not withdrawn, the notification will be examined pursuant to Commission
Regulation 17. The agreement in question will then be considered for exemption by a formal individual
decision or, in practice, for an informal comfort letter.
102. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 4(2).
103. Opposition procedures can also be found in other group exemptions. See, e.g., supra note
10, Commission Regulations 417/85 (specialization agreements), 418/85 (research and development
agreements), and 4087/88 (franchise agreements).
104. The period, however, is one month longer than the European Commission had suggested
at the hearing of interested parties on Jan. 31, 1995.
105. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 13.
106. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 11(3).
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the opposition procedure of the Regulation, as long as they do not contain black
clauses. 107
D.

CHANGES WHICH WERE PROPOSED BUT HAVE NOT BEEN ADOPTED

This chapter discusses three changes that were proposed during the drafting
of the Regulation, but which, in the end, were not adopted. Two changes were
proposed by the Commission: (1) the introduction of a market share test denying
the application of the Regulation (5.1);'08 and (2) the explicit severability of grey
clauses (5.2). '09 Industry proposed that vertical agreements would be treated more
friendly than horizontal agreements (5.3).
1. No Market Shares Test
The Commission expressed its worries about market shares in the context of
licensing agreements for the first time in the Tetra Pak I decision. "0 It held that
the acquisition by a dominant undertaking of an exclusive license amounted to
an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of article 86. " Apparently,
this decision has been the occasion for the Commission to decide that market
share thresholds should be included in group exemptions dealing with licensing
agreements.
The European Court of Justice has given some guidelines on the relation between market shares and a dominant position. Indeed, it has held that very large
shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of a
dominant position. In the Court's view that is the situation where there is a market
share of fifty percent." 2 This market share percentage is considerably higher
than the forty percent market share threshold suggested by the Commission in
its proposals for the Regulation.
In its first draft of the Regulation, the Commission proposed that territorial
protection would not be exempted, if (i) the licensee's market share wouldduring the exploitation of the license-have grown to more than forty percent;
or if (ii) licensor and licensee, being competitors, would have operated on an
oligopolistic market." 3 An oligopolistic market was defined as a market where
the parties and one other undertaking hold a market share of more than fifty
percent or if the parties and no more than three other undertakings together hold

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See supra note
See supra note
See supra note
See supra note
See supra note

1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 4(4).
21.
21.
21, Commission Decision, Tetra Pak I (BTG License).
21, Commission Decision Tetra Pak I (BTG License), at

27, 28.

112. See Akzo Chemie BV v. EC Commission (C-62/86), [1991] ECR 3359, [1993] 5 CMLR
215.

113. See supra note 24, art. 1 of the first draft.
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a market share of more than two thirds, and in either case the licensee had a
market share of at least ten percent."4
After lobbying from industry to remove these rather complicated and strict
market share criteria, a revised draft of the Regulation relaxed the thresholds.
First, the oligopolistic market share criterion was deleted completely. Secondly,
the remaining threshold was only relevant in so far as the contracting parties
were competitors. Thirdly, it was only measured at the moment the licensing
agreement was negotiated: the Regulation would, thus, not stop to apply if during
the currency of the licensing agreement the thresholds were exceeded.
This relaxed market share threshold was not acceptable to industry either. The
market share thresholds were criticized both by industry and in academic writing
for the following reasons."'
First, the introduction of market share criteria would have led to more uncertainty as to whether or not a technology transfer agreement is exempted by the
Regulation. Indeed, in order to examine whether the market share criteria are
fulfilled, it is necessary to define the relevant product and geographic market
and to evaluate the agreement in the context of its factual, legal, and economic
environments. Since the Commission has a wide discretion in defining relevant
markets, the introduction of the market share criteria leads automatically to discretion of the Commission in deciding whether an agreement falls under the Commission Regulation. The legal uncertainty created by the introduction of market share
thresholds would have been contrary to the very objective of a group exemption:
giving legal certainty to agreements that violate article 85(1) but have advantages
that outweigh their disadvantages.
Second, parties that notify their agreement in order to obtain an individual
decision pursuant to article 85(3) will most likely receive a comfort letter that
lacks the legal certainty of a formal exemption decision. Since parties that would
not have complied with the market share thresholds would have had to notify their
agreements in order to obtain an exemption, more parties to licensing agreements
would have had to be contented with an informal comfort letter instead of a
formal exemption.
This criticism seems to have convinced the Commission in the end, since it
abandoned the maximum market share threshold for its application. However,
the Commission may still withdraw the benefit of the Regulation if the effect of
an agreement is to prevent the licensed products from being exposed to effective
competition "which may in particular occur where the licensee's market share
exceeds forty percent. -116 This market share criterion is the leftover of the failed
attempt of the Commission to introduce maximum market shares above which
the Regulation could not apply.
114. See supra note 4, art. 1(5) of the first draft.
115. See the publications mentioned in note 25.
116. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 7(1).
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In particular, the Commission invites companies with a market share of more
than forty percent to notify their agreement even if the agreement falls within
the scope of the Regulation. "7 Since the mere fact that the licensee's market
share exceeds forty percent will not automatically lead to the conclusion that the
application of the Regulation is not justified, it is hoped that the Commission
will keep its promise to merely pay special attention to cases where the licensee is
dominant and not withdraw the benefit of the Regulation. " 8 Otherwise, dominant
licensees would, in practice, be forced to engage in costly and cumbersome
notifications, notwithstanding the fact that their license fulfills the conditions of
the Regulation. This would be at odds with the fact that having market power
as such is not contrary to articles 85 and 86. The fact that in the past the Commission has rarely withdrawn or threatened the withdrawal of a group exemption
may have been assuring. 19
2. Opposition Procedure versus Severability
In general, the use of the opposition procedure has not been widespread in
the past. Therefore, the Commission proposed in its first draft the complete
abolition of the opposition procedure. 120 Instead, it proposed a so-called severance
clause: ' grey clauses would not prevent the application of the Regulation to a
licensing agreement that otherwise fulfills the conditions of the Regulation. Such
grey clauses would, however, have been invalid, unless exempted by means of
an individual decision. 2' Following protest, the Commission has nevertheless
elected the opposition procedure in the Regulation. This is welcome for two
reasons.
First, the opposition procedure may create more legal certainty than a severance
clause. Indeed, notifying parties have certainty about the validity of their
agreement within a relative short period of time. Such certainty would not exist
under a severance clause: it is often far from clear whether a clause in a technology
transfer agreement infringes article 85(1). Therefore, it would have been far from
clear whether a clause would have been tenable. Second, under the Regulation, the
opposition procedure will probably be used more frequently than in the past.
Given that the black list has been shortened considerably compared to the Patent
and Know-How Regulations, grey clauses which in the past were black and could,
thus, not be exempted under the opposition procedure, might now well be. The
reduction of the black list may thus stimulate industry to use the opposition
procedure.
117. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital (27).
118. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital (26).
119. See supra note 21, for such (rare) examples in Tetra Pak I, and CFI, Langnese-Iglo GmbH
v. EC Commission (T-7/93), [1995] ECR 11-1539, [1995] ALL ER (EC) 908.
120. See supra note 24, art. 4 of the first draft of the Commission Regulation.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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The severance clause would not have avoided the following important legal
question that block exemptions have evoked. Indeed, it has never been clarified
in the case law of the European Court of Justice whether the Commission has
the competence to include opposition procedures in group exemptions, bypassing
in particular the safeguards for third parties in regular individual exemption
procedures. 2 3 By the same token, it is questionable whether the severability test
would have been compatible with the EC Treaty.
However, the severance clause would have resolved one important problem
of group exemptions. The Commission continues to take the view that the inclusion of an "exemptible" grey clause in a licensing agreement automatically
prevents the application of the Regulation to the whole of the agreement. 124 The
effects of this principle are particularly grave in technology transfer agreements
where exclusivity is of great importance. 125 Licensees may be inclined to undertake the investment required to manufacture, use and put a new product on the
market, only if they are given an exclusive territory. The severance clause would
have guaranteed that exclusivity in line with the Regulation would remain exempted, notwithstanding the inclusion of a grey clause.
During the hearing of January 31, 1995, industry proposed that the opposition
procedure and the severance clause become complementary options. Their coexistence would have enabled parties to a technology transfer agreement containing grey clauses to choose between the legal certainty of the opposition procedure on the one hand, or the application of the severance clause to only the grey
clauses on the other. The Commission rejected this proposal. It probably was
concerned that in practice the opposition procedure would not be used, and many
parties would take the risk of including objectionable restrictions in their
agreements, a risk that would be minimal because of the severability clause.
It is submitted that the Commission's "all or nothing" approach to agreements
including grey clauses and those that have not been exempted under the opposition
procedure may have disproportional consequences. This may lead national courts
to take a different approach. National courts have the power to determine whether
an agreement falls within a group exemption. 26 Accordingly, they should also
have the power to excise only grey clauses in order to bring the licensing

123. See, e.g., James S. Venit, The Commission's OppositionProcedure-Between the Scylla of
Ultra Vires and the Charybdis of Perfume: Legal Consequences and Tactical Considerations, 22
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 167 (1985).
124. Admittedly, the Commission is in this respect slightly less strict in the Regulation (and its
predecessors) than in other group exemptions. The group exemptions for exclusive distribution and
purchasing agreements, for instance, explicitly state that the inclusion of any restriction which is
not dealt with in the group exemption results in the nonapplicability of the group exemption. The
Commission Regulation, however, still applies where an agreement contains clauses with a more
limited scope than those mentioned in its exempted list or white list. See supra, section C.3.
125. See Axter, Das "Alles-oder-Nichts-Prinzip" der EG-Gruppenfreistellungsverordnungen,
WuW 7-8/1994, 615-22.
126. See ECJ, De Bloos S.p.r.l. v. Bouyer, (59/77), [19771 E.C.R. 2359, [1978] C.M.L.R. 511.
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agreement within the scope of a group exemption. 21 7 In the absence of a severance
clause in the Regulation, national courts may thus refuse to rule that the presence
of a grey clause results in the entire agreement being deemed not to qualify for
the group exemption under those national laws if parties did not make use of the
opposition procedure (for instance, because they thought that the clause 2in question did not restrict competition or was included in the "white list").
3. Vertical Licensing Agreements
The Commission treats a licensing agreement as horizontal once both licensor
and licensee are selling competing products. 129 Thus, the Patent and Know-How
Regulations did not distinguish, in principle, between horizontal and vertical
restraints, albeit that certain horizontal licensing agreements were excluded from
the scope of the two regulations. This situation has been criticized, since in a
lot of cases the licensee would not have had access to the licensed technology
without the license. 30 These cases, which the Commission considers horizontal,
are in reality vertical. Applying the stricter rules for horizontal licenses to such
agreements would therefore seem to be inappropriate. The Regulation does not
reflect criticism of the strict attitude towards vertical licensing agreements. Indeed, like its predecessors, the Regulation
generally does not distinguish between
13 1
horizontal and vertical restraints.
Because of its dubious basic assumptions, the Commission prohibits certain
clauses like, notably, the noncompetition clause in a manner that would be appropriate where the parties were horizontal competitors. 32 A noncompetition clause
in a horizontal agreement could constitute a cartel behind the facade of a technology license. The Commission is right in preventing such cartels. However, in

127. Parties could include a clause to that extent in their licensing agreement.
128. Admittedly, the Court of Justice has held that an agreement containing a black clause as a
whole falls outside the scope of a group exemption. See Case C-234/89, Delimitis v. Henninger
Byaugh, [1991] E.C.R. 1 935, [1992] 5 CMLR 210. However, the question is open whether this
case law also applies to agreements, including grey clauses that have not been exempted through
the opposition procedure. Moreover, as stated above (see supra note 4), applicable national law
decides on the consequences of infringements of art. 85(1). submitted that, therefore, national courts
applying national law may-notwithstanding the Delimitis judgment-excise grey (and even black)
clauses from an agreement that falls outside a group exemption and may thus convert such agreement
into agreements covered by a group exemption.
129. A license is horizontal if the licensor and licensees are actual or potential competitors. A
license has a vertical character if it affects activities that are in a complementary relationship. An
arrangement is vertical if, for instance, the licensor's primary line of business is in research and
development, and the licensee being a manufacturer buys the right to use the technology developed
by the licensor. An arrangement is also vertical if the licensor is a component manufacturer and
licenses technology to the licensee who combines the component with other components.
130. See James S. Venit, Know-How Licensing Under EEC Law: Where We Have Been, Where
We Are, and Where We May Be Heading, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 189, 222 (1987).
131. Like its predecessors, the Regulation excludes some horizontal agreements from its scope.
See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 5(1) and (2).
132. See Venit, supra note 19, at 530.
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vertical relationships a licensor can have a legitimate interest in imposing on its
licensee a noncompetition clause. This may, for instance, be the case if the clause
is necessary to ensure the maximum exploitation of the licensor's technology or
to prevent the licensee from making the licensed know-how available to the
licensor's competitors. Indeed, group exemptions for vertical agreements, such as
exclusive distribution and purchasing agreements, provide for a noncompetition
clause that a producer may impose on its distributor. 133
Admittedly, three "white-listed" clauses moderate the black-listed noncompetition clause (for both horizontal and vertical agreements). First, the white list
of the Commission Regulation allows the licensor to (i) terminate exclusivity
granted to a licensee; and (ii) cease communicating improvements in case the
licensee engages in competing activities. He may also require the licensee to
prove that the licensed know-how is not used for competing products.'4 Second,
the licensee may further be obliged to use his best endeavors to exploit the licensed
technology. 35
' Third, white-listed minimum royalty, minimum quality, and minimum process obligations on the licensee may weaken the licensee's inclination
36
to start producing competing products. 1
These three white-listed restrictions may significantly limit the competitive
activities of the licensee. Nevertheless, they prevent the licensor from terminating
the licensing agreement and, thus, granting a fully exclusive license to another
licensee should the first licensee start to use or develop rival technology.
The market share test that the Commission proposed in later drafts of the
Regulation would have introduced a different treatment of horizontal and vertical
agreements. Horizontal agreements exceeding a forty percent market share would
have fallen outside the scope of the Commission Regulation, while the market
share test would not have applied to vertical agreements. This would, however,
not have led to a more flexible treatment of vertical agreements, but to a stricter
approach towards horizontal agreements.
At one point, the Regulation now distinguishes between horizontal and vertical
agreements. Indeed, unlike the Patent and Know-How Regulations, the Regulation black-lists customers' allocation only in so far as the contracting parties are
competitors for the contract products at the time they concluded the licensing
agreement. 137 Vertical customer allocation is from now on grey listed and may
thus be exempted pursuant to the opposition procedure. Especially in vertical
relationships, there may be legitimate reason to protect a licensee from competition in respect of certain groups of customers. Indeed, it may be the best way
133. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 1983/83, art. 2(2)(a), and supra note 10, Commission Regulation 1984/83, art. 2(2).
134. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(18).
135. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(17).
136. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 2(l)(g).
137. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 3(4). It is not clear whether this
provision only applies to actual competitors or also to potential competitors.
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to ensure that customers are adequately supplied by a licensee that is willing to
make the necessary investments since he is sufficiently protected against competition in respect of certain groups of customers. The more flexible position of the
Commission towards customer allocation is to be welcomed.
However, the Commission can be criticized for being inconsistent by distinguishing between horizontal and vertical agreements in respect of customer allocation but not with regard to other clauses in licensing agreements, notably with
respect to noncompetition clauses.
E. A

BROADER SCOPE OF THE COMMISSION REGULATION

This chapter discusses two extensions of the scope of the group exemption
dealing with technology transfer agreements. First, an amendment, dating from
1993, in respect ofjoint ventures between competitors will be discussed in section
E. 1. ' Subsequently, it will be submitted that more intellectual property rights
may now benefit from the group exemption (section E.2).
1. Joint Ventures Between Competitors
The Commission Regulation excludes various agreements like patent or knowhow pools, licenses between competitors in a joint venture or between one of
them and the joint venture, reciprocal licenses with territorial limitations, and
39
agreements entered into solely for the purpose of sale from its application. 1
The Commission argues that such agreements pose problems that cannot be dealt
with in the Regulation. Therefore, the opposition procedure is not applicable.
However, these agreements are not per se "bad": after notification they may
be exemptible on an individual basis pursuant to article 85(3). '40
Not all licensing agreements between a joint venture and its competing parents
are excluded. Such agreements are covered by the Regulation (i. e., their clauses
can then be exempted, white-listed, or grey-listed) if certain market share thresholds are respected. 141In respect of the licensed products, the parents of the joint
venture may-together-not have a market share of more than twenty percent
in case of a license to a production joint venture, or a market share of more than
ten percent if the license also covers distribution. The Regulation copies in this
respect almost literally an amendment of the Patent and Know-How Regulations
dating from 1993.42
Contrary to the proposed market share test for the application of the Regulation
discussed above, 143 the inclusion of a market share test for joint ventures did not
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See supra note 2, Commission
See supra note 1, Commission
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See supra note 1, Commission
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become the target of criticism. This may be explained by the fact that the market
share test for joint ventures between competitors was a relaxation of the Commission's previous policy, while the proposed market share test for the application
of the Regulation was just the opposite.
It is thought that the percentage of joint venture agreements that actually have
benefited from the 1993 amendment is rather small. Indeed, the market share
requirement will be a problem in many cases, especially if the parties have
developed a new product or process. In such a situation, the joint venture partners
are likely to have a temporary lead over their competitors, during which their
market shares are likely to exceed the above-mentioned thresholds.'"
Joint ventures dealt with in the Regulation must be distinguished from those
covered by Regulation 418/85 which exempt certain joint research and development agreements. Regulation 418/85 relates to the licensing of products or processes where research and development are carried out jointly. This joint research
and development may be followed by joint exploitation within the limits of Regulation 418/85. After the 1993 amendment, Regulation 418/85 contains a twenty
percent and ten percent market share test, which is similar to that of the Regulation.
From this point of view there seems to be no advantage to bring a license to a
joint venture under Regulation 418/85 or
the Regulation. In any event, Regulation
45
418/85 prevails over the Regulation. 1
2. Other Intellectual Property Rights: Software Licenses
The Regulation applies to more intellectual property rights and software licenses than its predecessors.
First, the Regulation exempts provisions relating to intellectual property rights
other than patents (trademarks, design rights, and copyright, especially software
protection) 146 in so far as these provisions are "ancillary." Such provisions should
contain "no obligations restrictive of competition other than those also attached
' 14
to the licensed know-how or patents and exempted under this Regulation. 1
The Know-How Regulation contained similar rules on other intellectual property rights than patents. However, under this regulation, such other intellectual
property rights had to be ancillary within the meaning of providing "assistance
in achieving the object of the licensed technology.' ' 148 In the context of this
regulation, it has been rightly argued that the notion of "ancillary" is impossible
to apply objectively. For instance, where both a trademark and a know-how

144. See Ferdinandusse, The CooperativeJoint Venture: The Rehabilitationof a Neglected Child,

7 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 103-13 (1994).
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license are essential, it is impossible to say whether or not a trademark license
49
is ancillary and, therefore, falls within the scope of a group exemption.1
The new definition of "ancillary" in the Regulation should be easier to apply.
Moreover, more licenses of other intellectual property rights (including software
licensing agreements based on copyright) may now be covered by the Regulation
as soon as they are accompanied by patents or know-how within the meaning
of the Regulation. Indeed, the question whether or not these licenses are of
assistance in achieving the object of the licensed technology should no longer
play a role."5
Second, the Regulation extends the definition of patents considerably. As a
result the Regulation, unlike the Patent Regulation, now applies to topographies
of semiconductor products, plant breeders' certificates, and supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products.' 5'
From now on, more agreements may thus benefit from a group exemption.
This is welcome because it is hard to understand why licensing agreements that
have a similar object and effect as patent and know-how licenses would be excluded from the Regulation.
III. Conclusion
The Commission succeeded only partly in simplifying the way in which technology is transferred in the Community. First, pure patent licenses and know-how
licenses continue to be treated differently under the Regulation in respect of the
duration of territorial protection granted to a licensee. Second, the Regulation
introduces a vague concept of "necessary patents"' 52 to calculate the duration
of mixed licensing agreements. The rules on the duration of territorial protection,
therefore, remain rather complicated.
With one exception, the Regulation continues to treat vertical licenses as strict
as horizontal licenses, although this equal treatment has been rightly criticized
in the past. Further, it is considered unfair that agreements with a grey clause
fall completely outside the scope of the Regulation unless they are exempted
through the opposition procedure. This problem has become more relevant under
the Regulation than before, since there are now more grey clauses than before.
Some simplifications may be welcome. Notably, the black list and white list
are now equally applicable to all technology transfer agreements. The fact that
149. See KORAH, supra note 28, at 76. See, e.g., Commission Decision Moosehead/Whitbread,
1990 O.J. (L 100) 32, where a trademark was considered crucial to the transaction and so did not
qualify under the Know-How Regulation as ancillary to that of know-how.
150. Recital (6), Commission Regulation 240/96, still seems to refer also to the old definition of
"ancillary. "The explicit and unconditional definition of "ancillary" in art. 10(15) of the Commission
Regulation should, however, in our view, override the "old" definition in its recitals. See also
Kerse, supra note 1, at 335.
151. See supra note 1, Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 8(l)(c) and (g).
152. See text at supra note 50.
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the Regulation does not contain a market share threshold for its application is
also a welcome development. Such a threshold would have gone against the very
objective of a group exemption, which is creating legal certainty. Moreover,
there is no empirical evidence that economic welfare is served by stricter treatment
of licensing agreements.
It is appreciated that, in view of the longer white list and the shorter black
list, licensing agreements are treated more liberally than in the past. The fact that
the Regulation now applies to other intellectual property rights is also considered
positive.
On an international level, competition rules dealing with technology transfer
in the European Community, United States,' 53 and Japan'- 4 appear fairly similar
in substance, though procedures differ markedly. The difference in respect of
procedures may correspond to different legal traditions. There is no compelling
need to harmonize these procedures at an international level, as there is no evidence that procedural differences hamper or render too costly the conclusion of
international licensing agreements.

153. See the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property of 1995, 59 F.R.
41339 (1995). See also Guttoso, Technology TransferAgreements, FORDHAM CoRPu. L. INST. 1994;
Fogt, Knable Gotts, US Technology Licensing Agreements: Do New Enforcement Guidelines in the
United States MirrorDevelopments in the European Community, 4 EUR. COMP. L. REV., 215-19
[1995]; Davis, Johnston, Contrast or Convergence? The IP Guidelines and the New Technology
Transfer Block Exemption, ANTITRUST (American Bar Association) Vol. 9, No. 2, 16-21; Fogt,
Knable Gotts, Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different
Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 6 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327 [1996].

154. In Japan the rules on technology transfer agreements have been codified by the Japanese
Fair Trade Commission in "Guidelines for the Commission Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices
with Respect to Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements." These Guidelines were adopted on
February 15, 1989; they are a revision of similar Guidelines dating from May 24, 1968. See MITSUO
MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN (1993); Ohara, New Japanese Guidelines for the Commission Regulations of Restrictive Clauses in Patent and Know-How
Licensing Agreements, INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 656 (1991).
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